The United States no longer has to imagine whether privately operated technology essential to national defense can be restricted with little warning. Ukraine just experienced it.
Beginning in mid-October 2026, Ukrainian officials reported restrictions on SpaceX satellite communications. Equipment moving faster than approximately 100 miles per hour reportedly lost connectivity, disrupting drone operations during Russian attacks. The satellites themselves did not have to fail for an essential military capability to become less useful.
Who ordered the restrictions became a public dispute. The Wall Street Journal reported on October 20 that Elon Musk personally ordered the slowdown; CBS News separately attributed it to a Musk decision after discussions with administration officials. Reuters cited officials who said the Starshield order originated inside the White House. Musk maintained that the United States government controlled Starshield, the military-oriented service, while President Donald Trump denied ordering the slowdown.
On October 21, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said SpaceX contracts, not the White House, governed commercial Starlink access. The Wall Street Journal reported the next day that Trump asked Musk to lift the restrictions, but Trump denied discussing the matter with Musk on October 23.
On October 24, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Starlink and Starshield had returned to their previous speeds. Ukraine’s Defense Ministry reported stable connections on equipment moving faster than 400 kilometers per hour. Ukraine said the speed restrictions had been lifted.
Musk subsequently acknowledged SpaceX had restricted commercial Starlink, saying the company closed a loophole involving Ukrainian offensive drone strikes that violated its terms. Ukrainian presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov disputed that explanation, saying restrictions already prevented the long-range use Musk described. Musk continued to insist that the U.S. government controlled Starshield. His acknowledgment of commercial Starlink did not clarify who authorized the Starshield restrictions.
Restoration did not settle the conflicting accounts or answer who ultimately controlled the restrictions. That question remains important for American national security.
What happens when the United States depends on privately operated technology essential to national defense, but the government cannot guarantee continued access without the cooperation of the company providing it? This is not simply a question about SpaceX. It is a question about whether Congress has adequately protected America’s national-security interests.
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What Happens When the Owner Disagrees With the President?
Consider a future American administration that takes office following a contentious election. The owner of a company providing essential defense communications strongly opposes the new president’s policies. The disagreement may involve foreign policy, military spending, or an unrelated political dispute. The owner decides that the company will no longer provide the same level of service to the federal government.
Would existing contracts prevent that decision? Could the Pentagon maintain the affected capability independently? Would alternative communications systems be available immediately, or would the government discover that its options were limited?
We should not assume that current American defense contracts permit such conduct. The public record has not established that. Nor has it established that political disagreement motivated every restriction in Ukraine. But Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that service limits can have immediate military consequences while the dispute over who authorized them remains unresolved.
The danger is not simply that one company has become extraordinarily successful. A single provider, under the leadership of one individual, can become so central to military communications that losing access creates immediate national-security consequences. Starlink has competitors, including Eutelsat’s OneWeb, but describing it as a legal monopoly would require evidence beyond its market dominance. Competition offers limited protection when an alternative cannot quickly replace an essential service during a crisis. Whether a disruption comes from a corporate decision, a government order, a cyberattack, or an equipment failure, excessive dependence on one provider can leave the military with too few options.
The American people elect their government. They do not elect defense contractor executives. Those contractors may have legitimate business interests and contractual rights, but their personal political preferences should not determine the availability of essential American defense capabilities.
A government contract is a legal promise. It does not necessarily give the government independent technical control over the systems needed to fulfill that promise. When national security depends on that difference, Congress must understand it.
Congress Has More Options Than Nationalization
Private enterprise has contributed enormously to American technological and military strength. Companies develop sophisticated systems, employ skilled workers, invest private capital, and create capabilities that government agencies might struggle to produce themselves.
The Constitution does not require the federal government to own every satellite network, communications system, or piece of technology used in national defense. However, Congress has substantial Article I authority to provide for the common defense, fund and regulate the armed forces, and set the laws governing federal defense programs.
Congress can establish stronger conditions for defense contracts. It can require continuity-of-service guarantees, dependable alternatives, documented procedures for restricting access, and clearly defined emergency operating rights. Such requirements would establish expectations before a contractor dispute or national-security emergency occurs.
Existing law already provides some tools. The Defense Production Act allows the government, under specified conditions, to prioritize certain contracts and allocate materials, services, and facilities needed for national defense. But those powers do not automatically give the Pentagon independent technical control over a privately operated satellite network.
Where existing authority proves insufficient, Congress could authorize additional safeguards, including temporary government operating rights over narrowly defined critical capabilities during genuine national-security emergencies. Such intervention would require carefully written legislation, prearranged technical arrangements, and appropriate protections for private property.
The Fifth Amendment requires just compensation when the government takes private property for public use. Eminent domain could therefore be considered if acquiring specific property rights became necessary and legally justified. But obtaining limited operational rights should not be confused with purchasing or seizing an entire company.
The Constitution also limits who can authorize extraordinary government action. In 1952, the Supreme Court rejected President Harry Truman’s attempt to seize American steel mills during the Korean War. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court concluded that the president lacked the necessary legal authority.
National security did not erase the separation of powers, and it should not do so now. Congress should not create unlimited presidential authority to control private communications infrastructure. A safeguard against arbitrary contractor restrictions must not become permission for the White House to impose arbitrary restrictions. The objective should be reliable national-defense capabilities governed by enforceable law, with meaningful oversight of both contractors and executive officials.
Congress Needs to Do More Than Investigate
Congress has already begun examining the disruption in Ukraine. On October 15th, a bipartisan group of nine senators requested a Department of Defense inspector general investigation. On October 19, four senators demanded that SpaceX explain its authority over Starlink and Starshield access, including when services could be restricted.
By October 21st, the scrutiny had widened. Republican Representative Brian Fitzpatrick called for witnesses, including Musk if necessary, to testify under oath about who authorized the restrictions. Zelenskyy said the service remained limited at that time, before Ukraine reported its restoration on October 24th.
On October 22nd, Senator Richard Blumenthal, the ranking member of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, announced an inquiry into Starlink, Starshield, and the Department of Defense’s reliance on SpaceX. Letters to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Musk asked who could authorize and implement service restrictions, what safeguards existed, and how much independence the Pentagon retained. Blumenthal requested written answers by November 5 and a briefing from knowledgeable SpaceX officials by November 12. The inquiry has not yet established responsibility or determined that a law or contract was violated.
On October 26th, six lawmakers from the House and Senate publicly pressed SpaceX for additional answers about who ordered the restrictions, whether American or Russian officials had been consulted, and who possesses operational authority over access to the systems. They requested a response by October 31.
However, those oversight efforts have already encountered a setback. On October 28th, the Associated Press reported that the Defense Department inspector general declined the bipartisan request to investigate the disruptions, saying the department could address the concerns internally. Senator Jeanne Shaheen called for an independent accounting. The inspector general said the office could reconsider if new information emerged. The decision left unresolved who authorized the restrictions and whether existing oversight protections are adequate.
The continuing congressional inquiries may establish who authorized Ukraine’s restrictions. But identifying responsibility for one incident will not, by itself, determine whether America’s essential defense systems are protected against another. Congress has three concrete responsibilities worth examining.
First, it should require the Department of Defense to identify indispensable privately operated systems and determine which capabilities the government cannot maintain independently. That examination should extend beyond satellite communications to other contracted services whose interruption could seriously affect military readiness. Congress could review sensitive findings through classified oversight rather than disclosing them publicly.
Second, Congress should establish enforceable continuity requirements for critical defense contracts. Contractors should know in advance what service guarantees, notification procedures, emergency access arrangements, and backup capabilities are required. Where a system cannot reasonably be operated independently, the government should have a credible alternative, including the ability to continue essential missions when one provider is unavailable.
Third, Congress should determine whether existing law provides sufficient authority to maintain essential services during a contractor dispute or national-security emergency. If it does not, lawmakers should consider narrowly tailored legislation defining when intervention is permitted, who authorizes it, how compensation works, and how Congress and the courts can review abuses.
These protections would cost money. Maintaining backup systems, negotiating additional operating rights, and reducing dependence on a single provider are not free. Congress would need to compare those costs with the consequences of losing access to an indispensable capability. That is precisely the kind of decision elected representatives are supposed to make.
The country should not discover the weaknesses in its defense arrangements only after an emergency exposes them. Congressional oversight is important, but lasting protection requires enforceable standards and the resources necessary to implement them.
National Defense Cannot Depend on Goodwill
Under the Square New Deal, corporate stewardship recognizes that private enterprise has responsibilities when its products become essential to public safety and national defense. Profit and ownership remain legitimate, but so do enforceable obligations arising from the services a company agrees to provide.
Government stewardship means Congress must establish rules that protect the public interest, rather than assuming private contractors will always cooperate or elected officials will always exercise sound judgment. Citizen stewardship means asking whether the institutions entrusted with our national defense have established protections that work regardless of who holds political power.
None of this requires hostility toward private enterprise. It requires recognizing that the federal government’s constitutional responsibility for national defense cannot be transferred entirely to a corporation simply because that corporation developed the technology.
Ukraine has demonstrated how quickly restrictions on a critical communications service can affect military operations. The service has reportedly been restored, but the competing explanations from American officials and SpaceX have made the question of operational authority even more important.
Congress must determine whether similar vulnerabilities exist in American defense infrastructure and what protections are needed to address them. The solution is not necessarily government ownership. It is ensuring that indispensable military capabilities remain available under lawful, enforceable arrangements rather than depending on anyone’s personal or political goodwill.
Private enterprise has helped America build extraordinary national-defense capabilities. But innovation does not relieve government of its constitutional responsibilities.
The government does not have to own every satellite in the sky, but it must never discover during a national-security crisis that someone else has the only switch.
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Having a private company with that much power over national security is a bad idea.